# 1NC

## 1

#### **The President of the United States should establish a public legal framework to codify targeted killing with respect to international law**

#### Executive restraint solves

Laura Twomey, March 14, 2013, Trinity College Dublin, published in the Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, “Setting a Global Precedent: President Obama's Codification of Drone Warfare” http://www.cjicl.org.uk/index.php/cjicl-blog/setting-a-global-precedent-president-obamas-codification-of-drone-warfare

It is therefore suggested that the Administration should take this opportunity to codify the rules, clarify terms where ambiguity may currently allow for broader interpretations, and to bring its regulations in line with the existing framework of international law. This legal framework should then be made available to the public, with covert operational necessities redacted. This could set a valuable legal precedent, of particular importance at this turning point wherein international law must adapt to the 21st century model of warfare, a model which lacks a clear enemy and a demarcated battlefield.

#### **Codification prevents** m**iscalculation**

Justin Metz, April, 2013, thesis for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors in Government for the Wesleyan University Honors College, “The Drone Wars: Uncovering the Dynamics and Scope of United States Drone Strikes” http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2019&context=etd\_hon\_theses

I believe that a firmly codified and publicized set of conditions for drone strikes could help prevent unnecessary strikes, reduce collateral damage, and limit unnecessary or counterproductive United States involvement in global conflict. Further, codifying the strike process would ensure that the drone program is subject to appropriate oversight and the individuals who are killed are done so for legitimate national security reasons. Finally, as the United States is both a pioneer in the use of drones and a world superpower, a US system for strike authorization would likely influence other countries that develop drones. The United States would be able to influence drone use of foreign powers if it developed a legitimate process for authorizing strikes.

## 2

#### 4GW is the most accurate description of modern war- escalation is likely if uncontained- executive authority is key to counter these threats

Li 2009 [Zheyoa Li Winter, 2009 The Georgetown Journal of Law Public Policy 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373 “War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare” lexis]

Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the institution of the nation-state has been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons. 122 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that conventional wars remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945. 123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing any coherent policy. Rather, they see their fight as a life-and-death struggle, wherein the ordinary terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and ends. 124¶ It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the modern trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that:¶ [\*395] In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides the impetus for the formulation of a new theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part III, supra, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, was not designed to cope with the current international system, one that is characterized by the persistent machinations of international terrorist organizations, the rise of multilateral alliances, the emergence of rogue states, and the potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and otherwise.

#### Most likely nuclear escalation

Richards 2005 (Dr. Chet Richards, J. Addams & Partners July 12, 2005, “Dear Mr. & Ms. 1RP: Welcome to the 21st Century” http://www.zmetro.com/pdf/2005/07/welcome\_21st\_century\_v4.pdf)

Beginning with Mao Tse-Tung, and continuing to the present day, insurgency and other forms of non-state warfare have become more potent and much more dangerous in at least two ways: Groups other than states – that is, multinational organizations ranging from alQa’ida to the narcotrafficking cartels – are beginning to acquire high levels of sophistication in organization and in the information technologies that allow them to plan and conduct operations while widely dispersed.4 These same groups increasingly have the financial wherewithal to acquire virtually any type of weapon, from small arms to chemical and biological to nuclear, that they need to carry out operations. The only exceptions are conventional weapons such as tanks, combat aircraft, and fighting ships that require large facilities to support them, but are primarily of use only against other military forces armed with the same types of weapons. They are using their new capabilities not only to fight local governments, as was the case with traditional insurgencies, but to attack distant superpowers as well. Because they can’t field sizable amounts of conventional military hardware, fourth generation (4GW) forces will never try to achieve victory by defeating the military forces of a state in stand-up battles. Instead, they will try to convince their state opponent that it is simply not worth it to continue the fight. Successful 4GWcampaigns in modern times would include those against the French in Algeria, the US in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, where the insurgents never defeated the foreign armies in any major battle, but eventually persuaded the governments back home to withdraw them. In a well run 4GW campaign, everything the 4GW forces do – including fighting and usually losing the occasional major battle – will support this goal. Persuading governments to withdraw forces, rather than defeating them on the battlefield, is an “information age” goal.6 To achieve the necessary level of persuasion, practitioners of 4GWwill use every information tool they can find to spread their messages to the enemy population and decision makers: Our cause is just and no threat to you There’s nothing here worth your effort and sacrifice Your troops are becoming brutal and your tactics ineffective If you keep it up, you’re going to bleed for a very long time So why not just leave now? As we enter the 21st Century, 4GWorganizations are becoming adept at spreading such messages through new channels, such as global news services (CNN, Al Jazeerah) and of course, web sites, blogs, and mass e-mailings. What you may not be aware of is that 4GWorganizations are also using the latest information tools to communicate with each other and to share information, particularly about what is and is not working (what the military calls “lessons learned.”)7Messages may be encrypted, or sent using code phrases, or even hidden in web site images, a practice called steganography. As with so many information age techniques, instructions for encryption and steganography are floating all over the Internet. Information age techniques are ideal for loose networks of highly motivated individuals, which is a typical form of organization for 4GW groups. Modern information warfare places a higher premium on creativity and innovation than it does on things 4GW organizations typically don’t have, like massive forces, volumes of regulations, and expensive hardware.8 By emphasizing speed and innovation, 4GWgroups can often invent new techniques faster than more structured and bureaucratic organizations such as the Pentagon.9 First responder organizations themselves may be targets of information warfare operations. The information systems of 1RP organizations, including operational systems as well as payroll and administrative, might make attractive targets in coordination with a physical attack. This is a real threat: Many members of al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups are from the educated classes in their countries, were technically trained (Osama bin Laden is a civil engineer), studied and lived in the West, and are capable of conceiving and managing such attacks. There are other advantages to the non-state player from operating in a loose social network. Obviously a social network is harder to find than an organization that requires a fixed infrastructure and wears uniforms. But perhaps most significant in wars of the weak against the strong, networks are highly resilient, so killing their leaders and destroying portions of the network can leave the rest to regenerate under new leadership in different locations.1112 So long as enough of the network survives to pass along the ideology and culture, along with lessons learned, the new network will likely be more dangerous and more resilient than its predecessor, much like the more resistant forms of bacteria that can emerge as a result of mis-use of antibiotics. In fact, the European resistance movements during World War II exhibited just this kind of toughness and survivability. In addition to its networked structure, there are other attributes of 4GW that should concern the 1RP (editor’s note: First Responder) community. The first is its transnational nature. An operation can be approved in Afghanistan, planned in Germany, funded in the Middle East, and carried out in the United States, as was the 9/11 attack. There is no one state we can retaliate against, nor one nationality we can profile against. Further, because it is transnational, it can involve networks of networks, such as alQa’ida attempting to cooperate with narco-trafficking organizations in Latin America to trade access to potential base areas and help in infiltrating the US for assistance in distributing narcotics.13 The upshot is that the lack of identifiable 4GW activity may not be an indication that an attack is not in the works, if the su4rveillance is being conducted by someone else. One of the more unpleasant aspects of insurgencies that will likely carry over to 4GWis their use of disguise, camouflage, and the other tools of deception. Because they are militarily weak, 4GW groups survive not by confronting superior firepower but by staying out of its sights. Those that have survived have become masters of concealment and deception, making it even more difficult to pick up early warning signals. This is why simple ethnic or national profiling will not work – 4GWteams will go to great lengths not to be identified as members of the groups in question. Skin color, eye color, and hair color are trivially easy to change, and the criminal infrastructure that already exists in most developed countries makes it simple to get drivers licenses or other means of identification (as any victim of identity theft can attest.) In a pinch, one can always recruit a member of a non-targeted group, such as the “shoe bomber,” Richard Reid, and it would be a mistake to assume the next batch will be as poorly trained. If we’re going to let Icelanders (or grandmothers or parents with toddlers, or whoever) through with less security screening than Saudis or Pakistanis or Jordanians, see if you can guess what the next aircraft hijacker will look like. Another unpleasant fact of 4GW is that like insurgency from whence it sprang, 4GW will be a protracted struggle.14 As Henry Kissinger once noted, if the guerillas don’t lose, they win, so they have all the motivation they need to keep going for as long as they think it will take.15 First responders should not draw comfort from what seems like a pause in attacks – operational cycles can stretch over several years, and a fourth generation war can span decades.16 But the most unpleasant fact of 4GW is that in it, we have finally reached the level of total war.17 In the eyes of the 4GW attacker, there are no civilians and no noncombatants. A concern for public relations offers the only reason for limiting the scope or violence of the attacks. What seems like “terrorism” to us, or senseless, random violence, may appear to the 4GW network as a legitimate way to persuade the foreign state government to withdraw, that is to stop the war. Such a strategy is nothing new. It was what Sherman had in mind during his marches through the South after the fall of Vicksburg (July 1863).18 In its local areas, the 4GW organization will spread the message that the foreign state has killed many civilians, which in a war of an advanced state versus a Third World country will often be true and will always be believed. What this means is that when a 4GW group decides to directly attack the United States or another state involved in “their” struggle, no level of violence, even nuclear, is ruled out. They may calculate that the message they are sending to the state government, to the state’s population, to undecided elements in other parts of the world, and to their own members is worth any backlash from the scenes of horror and brutality that ensue.

## 3

#### Debt deal happening now but PC is key to prevent Republican hardline stance on spending cuts – our evidence assumes dem concessions

Kapur 9/9 Sahil Kapur, TPM's senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent, his articles covering politics and public policy have been published in The Huffington Post, The Guardian and The New Republic, “{Is House GOP Backing Down In Debt Limit Fight?”, Talking Points Memo, Seotember 9th, 2013, http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/house-gop-cantor-memo-debt-ceiling-cr-sequester-immigration.php?ref=fpb

House Republicans are taming members’ expectations ahead of the debt limit showdown, signaling that they may not be able to extract significant concessions from Democrats.¶ A Friday memo to GOP members by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) says “the House will act to prevent a default on our obligations before” the mid-October deadline the Obama administration has established. “House Republicans,” he says, “will demand fiscal reforms and pro-growth policies which put us on a path to balance in ten years in exchange for another increase in the debt limit.”¶ The language is vague — intentionally so, in order to maintain wiggle room for Republicans to avert a disastrous debt default. President Barack Obama has vowed not to pay a ransom to ensure the U.S. can meet its obligations.¶ If and when they do cave, Republicans will be hard-pressed to show their base they got something in return for raising the debt ceiling. In January, they got Senate Democrats to agree to pass a non-binding budget resolution. This time around, the possibilities for symbolic concessions range from a doomed Senate vote to delay or defund Obamacare or instructions to initiate the process of tax reform.¶ There are a number of demands rank-and-file Republicans have urged leaders to make which could genuinely complicate the battle, such as dollar-for-dollar spending cuts or unwinding Obamacare. Cantor’s memo mentioned neither. GOP members have also called on leadership not to bring up any debt limit bill that lacks the support of half the conference. Boehner hasn’t committed to this and Cantor didn’t mention it in his memo.¶ There are several reasons Republicans will have a hard time extracting concessions. Back in January, when Obama held firm and refused to negotiate on the debt limit, Republicans folded and agreed to suspend the debt ceiling without substantial concessions but rather symbolic ones. And due to deep divisions within the conference, House Republicans will face enormous challenges in rounding up 218 votes to pass any conceivable debt limit hike.

#### GOP hates the aff – support for broad targeted killing powers

Savage 11 Charlie Savage, newspaper reporter in Washington, D.C., with the New York Times, “In G.O.P. Field, Broad View of Presidential Power Prevails”, Herald Tribune, December 20th, 2011, http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20111229/ZNYT02/112293016/-1/news?Title=In-G-O-P-Field-Broad-View-of-Presidential-Power-Prevails

WASHINGTON — Even as they advocate for limited government, many of the Republican presidential candidates hold expansive views about the scope of the executive powers they would wield if elected — including the ability to authorize the targeted killing of United States citizens they deem threats and to launch military attacks without Congressional permission.

#### Congressional restrictions of WPA guts Obama political credibility

Douglas L., Kriner 2010 Assistant Prof - PoliSci Boston U.

“After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, pages 68-72, googlebooks

While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in stales, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War."" In addition to boding ill for the president's perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson's dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision. Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's highest second-term domestic priorities, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena. Congress and the Military Costs of the Use of Force A growing game-theoretic literature within international relations suggests that these very same congressional actions can, however unintentionally, also raise or lower the military costs for the president of pursuing his preferred policy course. High-profile congressional support for or opposition to the presidents military policies does more than shape real and anticipated public opinion and affect the presidents levels of political capital in Washington. It also sends important signals of American resolve or disunity to foreign actors. Target state leaders conduct their own cost-benefit analyses when plotting their military policy courses, and they may incorporate congressional signals into these calculations. An extensive literature in international relations examines the importance of signal credibility for interstate crisis bargaining and the initiation of military action.43 In the international system, states are constantly sending signals about their expectations of and intentions toward other stale actors. When challenged by another country, a state’s leaders not only must weigh the costs and benefits of complying with their adversary's demand: but, perhaps even more critically, they must also evaluate the opposing slate's willingness to follow through on its threat to use force if necessary to achieve its objective. The decision of Congress to back or oppose the president's threat thus conveys important information about American resolve to the target state. Moreover, when the president decides whether or not to threaten a target state with military action, he may anticipate the effect of likely congressional reactions to his decision on the credibility of the signal he will send to the target. Thus, because they can affect signal credibility\* even anticipated congressional support or opposition can affect the cost-benefit calculations of both the president and the leader of the target state at the conflict initiation phase.\*\* Signals or American resolve or disunity may also affect the target slate's calculations and. in turn, the military costs to the president of staying the course throughout the conflict conduct phase. 64 Public displays of legislative support for the president’s conduct of military operations enhance the credibility of executive commitments to stay the course, and may deter the target state from escalating its resistance in the hope of outlasting American political will.65 Conversely, as presidents throughout American history have admonished would-be opponents in Congress, open legislative opposition to the president's military course sends visible signals of American ambivalence, which may steel the target state's resolve to continue to resist once a conflict has begun. For example, Vice President Dick Cheney was particularly aggressive in leveling this charge against Democratic opponents of the war in Iraq. In response to congressional efforts to set a timetable for phased withdrawal from Iraq in early 2007, Cheney minced few words: "When members of Congress pursue an antiwar strategy that's been called 'slow Bleeding. They are not supporting the troops, they are undermining them." Vocal opposition in Congress, he charged, was a prescription for certain defeat as it was tantamount to "telling the enemy simply to watch the clock and wait us out "66 A number of congressional Republicans echoed Cheney's rhetoric: for example. South Carolina Senator Jim Dc\* Mint asserted in 2007 that responsibility for American deaths in Iraq belonged not to President Bush, but to Democratic opponents of the war in Congress. "Al-Qaida knows that we've got a lot of wimps in Congress." DeMint said. "I believe a lot of the casualties can be laid at the feet of all the talk in Congress about how we've got to get out, we've got to cut and run."67 While such scathing rhetoric is obviously calculated to score political points, internal administration memoranda from the Reagan era show that, even far from the public eye, many in the executive branch fervently believe that the signals Congress sends through its actions can have real consequences on the ground. CIA and National Security Council evaluations of the situation in Lebanon in 1983 held that it deteriorated in large part because Syria believed that congressional opposition to the Marine mission was evidence that the United States had "short breath" and was unwilling to pay the costs of staying the course in Beirut.4\* The signals sent by congressional opposition increased the perceived military costs of continuing the Marine mission in Lebanon. Ultimately, this helped tilt the administration's cost-benefit calculation toward ending the venture. Theoretical Expectations Through these three mechanisms, the theory argues that real or anticipated congressional support or opposition can affect the cost-benefit calculations of the president and the target state's leader as well as, ultimately, both the initiation and conduct of major military ventures. Empirical testing of the theory proceeds in two stages. First, because assessing Congress's influence on actual policy outcomes is most amenable to large-n, empirical analysis, the models in the following two chapters test a series of hypotheses that arc derived from the theory and developed below. However, the posited theoretical mechanisms that link congressional actions with changes in policy outcomes are difficult to test statistically. For example, large-n analyses of hundreds of uses of force may show the predicted correlations between public congressional opposition to the president's policies and decreased conflict duration; however, such models offer little insight into the mechanisms linking cause and effect. Accordingly, to test the proposed theoretical mechanisms described previously more directly, the analysis continues in chapter 5 with a historical case study that draws on extensive archival evidence to trace the causal processes by which actions in Congress produced tangible changes in the conduct of American military policy. For the remainder of this chapter, however, the emphasis is on the ultimate consequences of congressional actions for policy outcomes.

#### Default collapses international status of the dollar – fiscal security is the ONLY reason surplus countries still invest

Masters 13 Jonathan Masters, has a graduate degree in social theory from The New School University where he focused on media and international relations. He also holds a B.A. in political science from Emory University, writes on issues related to national security and civil liberties, and contributes to CFR's Renewing America initiative that focuses on the economic underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy, “U.S. Debt Ceiling: Costs and Consequences”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2nd, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/us-debt-ceiling-costs-consequences/p24751#p8

Historically, the U.S. Treasury market has been driven by huge investments from surplus countries like Japan and China, which view the United States as the safest place to store their savings. A 2011 Congressional Research Service report suggests that a loss of confidence in the debt market could prompt foreign creditors to unload large portions of their holdings, thus inducing others to do so, and causing a run on the dollar in international markets. However, others claim that a sudden sell-off would run counter to foreign economic interests, as far as those interests run parallel to a robust U.S. economy.¶ While many U.S. exporters would benefit from dollar depreciation because it would increase foreign demand for their goods (effectively making them cheaper), the same firms would also bear higher borrowing costs from rising interest rates.¶ A potential long-term concern of some U.S. officials is that persistent volatility of the dollar will add force to recent calls by the international community for an end to its status as the world's reserve currency. A 2010 survey performed by the McKinsey Global Institute found fewer than 20 percent of business executives surveyed expected the dollar to be the dominant global reserve currency by 2025.

#### Dollar hegemony status is key to overall US economic and military leadership

William Clark, 2003; economic consultant and journalist, January (revised March 2003), “The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War with Iraq”, <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/RRiraqWar.html>

This unique geo-political agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1974 has worked to our favor for the past 30 years, as this arrangement has eliminated our currency risk for oil, raised the entire asset value of all dollar denominated assets/properties, and allowed the Federal Reserve to create a truly massive debt and credit expansion (or `credit bubble' in the view of some economists). These structural imbalances in the U.S. economy are sustainable as long as: 1. Nations continue to demand and purchase oil for their energy/survival needs 2. the world's monopoly currency for global oil transactions remains the US dollar 3. the three internationally traded crude oil markers remain denominated in US dollars These underlying factors, along with the `safe harbor' reputation of U.S. investments afforded by the dollar's reserve currency status propelled the U.S. to economic and military hegemony in the post-World War II period. However, the introduction of the euro is a significant new factor, and appears to be the primary threat to U.S. economic hegemony. Moreover, in December 2002 ten additional countries were approved for full membership into the E.U. Barring any surprise movements, in 2004 this will result in an aggregate E.U. GDP of $9.6 trillion and 450 million people, directly competing with the U.S. economy ($10.5 trillion GDP, 280 million people).

#### Nuclear war

Khalilzad 11 [Zalmay Khalilzad, counselor at CSIS, served as US Ambassador to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the UN under Bush II, former Asst. Prof of Poli Sci @ Columbia, PhD from University of Chicago, “The Economy and National Security,” Feb 8 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad]

The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years.¶ Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally.¶ Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments.¶ We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.¶ The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.¶ American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.¶ As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

## Terror

#### **The United States federal government should substantially increase its humanitarian aid to Yemen.**

#### **Humanitarian aid is a prerequisite to Yemeni stability – now is key**

United Nations, 2013(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 15 July 2013, cites OuldCheikh Ahmed, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen and Dr. Abdullah Al-Matouq, Secretary-General’s Humanitarian Envoy for Kuwait, “Yemen: Efforts to bring stability could fail unless basic needs are met, warns UN” http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/yemen-efforts-bring-stability-could-fail-unless-basic-needs-are-met-warns-un)

The UN has warned that efforts to find a political solution to the insecurity that has plagued Yemen since 2011 could be undermined unless support for humanitarian programmes is quickly and dramatically increased. This warning came as UN agencies and partners released their revised humanitarian appeal for 2013. The revised plan now calls for US$702 million to assist approximately 7.7 million Yemenis. The original plan released at the end of 2012 called for $716 million. The slight decrease is partly the result of some unfunded projects that were intended for the first half of the year. So far, only about 38 per cent of funds needed have been received. “The ongoing political transition (has) overshadowed the humanitarian crisis,” said Mr. OuldCheikh Ahmed, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen. “Our fear is that any movement towards stability could collapse unless people’s very basic needs are met.” Mr. Ahmed’s warning echoes that of the Secretary-General’s Humanitarian Envoy for Kuwait, Dr. Abdullah Al-Matouq, who visited Yemen at the beginning of July. “Yemen is going through a period of political transition, but the humanitarian situation remains serious with millions of vulnerable people in urgent need of emergency and early recovery assistance,” said Dr. Al-Matouq. “There can be no sustainable transition unless their basic humanitarian needs are met. This crisis could affect the recent political achievements unless it is comprehensively addressed.” A humanitarian “red line” Two years of unrest and instability have left approximately 13 million people – about half of the entire population – in need of humanitarian assistance. Many basic services have collapsed, and levels of poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition have all risen sharply. Given the considerable needs and slow donor response, the UN has taken the unusual step of producing a list of activities that it considers most critical. These critical humanitarian projects add up to almost $209 million – about 40 per cent of the $528 million still needed to implement the response plan. “For us, these activities represent the humanitarian ‘red line’ for Yemen,” continued Mr Ahmed. “These are what we need to urgently deliver. They will save the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable Yemenis. “I urge international and regional donors to provide funding for these critical activities that will have an immediate impact.” Window of opportunity Humanitarian needs have remained high since the end of last year when the humanitarian appeal was first launched. However, improved stability and the ongoing reform process have opened a window of opportunity for humanitarian partners to contribute to a sustainable improvement of people’s lives. In the south of the country, more than 90 per cent of people who had fled violence have now returned home. But Mr. Ahmed argues that for the return of displaced people to be sustainable, humanitarian and development agencies need to focus their efforts on building the capacity of returnees to withstand any future threats or challenges by, for example, restoring damaged infrastructure and basic services, clearing land mines and re-establishing law and order. “We have an opportunity to help people settle back into their lives, and become more resilient against new challenges,” said Mr Ahmed. “But this window of opportunity may not stay open for long.”

#### Drones don’t drive AQAP recruitment –economics do

Swift 2012 [Christopher Swift is a fellow at the University of Virginia’s Center for National Security Law and author of the forthcoming “The Fighting Vanguard: Local Insurgencies in the Global Jihad July 1, 2012 Foreign Affairs “The Drone Blowback Fallacy¶ Strikes in Yemen Aren't Pushing People to Al Qaeda” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137760/christopher-swift/the-drone-blowback-fallacy]

Last month, I traveled to Yemen to study how AQAP operates and whether the conventional understanding of the relationship between drones and recruitment is correct. While there, I conducted 40 interviews with tribal leaders, Islamist politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources. These subjects came from 14 of Yemen’s 21 provinces, most from rural regions. Many faced insurgent infiltration in their own districts. Some of them were actively fighting AQAP. Two had recently visited terrorist strongholds in Jaar and Zinjibar as guests. I conducted each of these in-depth interviews using structured questions and a skilled interpreter. I have withheld my subjects’ names to protect their safety — a necessity occasioned by the fact that some of them had survived assassination attempts and that others had recently received death threats.¶ These men had little in common with the Yemeni youth activists who capture headlines and inspire international acclaim. As a group, they were older, more conservative, and more skeptical of U.S. motives. They were less urban, less wealthy, and substantially less secular. But to my astonishment, none of the individuals I interviewed drew a causal relationship between U.S. drone strikes and al Qaeda recruiting. Indeed, of the 40 men in this cohort, only five believed that U.S. drone strikes were helping al Qaeda more than they were hurting it.¶ Al Qaeda exploits U.S. errors, to be sure. As the Yemen scholar Gregory Johnsen correctly observes, the death of some 40 civilians in the December 2009 cruise missile strike on Majala infuriated ordinary Yemenis and gave AQAP an unexpected propaganda coup. But the fury produced by such tragedies is not systemic, not sustained, and, ultimately, not sufficient. As much as al Qaeda might play up civilian casualties and U.S. intervention in its recruiting videos, the Yemeni tribal leaders I spoke to reported that the factors driving young men into the insurgency are overwhelmingly economic.

#### **Drones destroy terror cells – many reasons**

Justin Metz, April, 2013, thesis for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors in Government for the Wesleyan University Honors College, “The Drone Wars: Uncovering the Dynamics and Scope of United States Drone Strikes” http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2019&context=etd\_hon\_theses

In the United States case, because US goals are focused on long-term prevention of attacks and dismantling of al-Qaeda, a wider range of targeting killing (not just killings of important figures) may be more effective-though likely even harder to measure in terms of efficacy. In Afghanistan for example, Alex Wilner argues through a study of targeted killing of Taliban members that: Findings suggest that the eliminations degraded Taliban professionalism, diminished the group’s success rates, influenced their selection of targets, and weakened morale. These findings speak to the efficacy of targeted killings in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.87Other scholars of the US case echo Wilner’s argument using qualitative evidence finding targeting killing disrupts normal operations enough to be deemed effective. 88 Scholarly attention has focused more on high profile targeted killings such as the 2002 killing of Abu Ali al-Harithi, the Yemeni mastermind behind the attacks on the USS Cole. Because terrorists are largely unable to strike US forces it is almost impossible to measure whether targeted killings actually work. Morehouse studies general terrorist activity in Pakistan in the years 2004-2009 in relation to US drone strikes in the area to argue that there is little correlation between US drone strikes and terrorist activities. Morehouse considers a wide variety of insurgent attacks primarily against Pakistani targets as a test of the efficacy of targeted killing.89 Though an interesting method of evaluating targeted killing, the methodology is flawed. Pakistan is an incredibly volatile country. It is impossible to ascribe a terrorist attack against non-US personnel as retaliation for US action. Using largely the same dataset and similar methodology, Olney finds that there is an increase in attacks against local governments in response to US drone strikes. However, as even he admits, “without further evaluation of more variables, including domestic military operations, recruitment levels, and other political factors, it is difficult to conclude that drone strikes are solely responsible for the increased militant attacks on host nations.”90

#### Drones empirically effective in Yemen – no alternative

Watts and Cilluffo 2012 [Clinton Watts is a Senior Analyst with the Navanti Group and a Senior Fellow at The ¶ George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI). He is also a ¶ former U.S. Army Officer and former Special Agent with the FBI. Frank J. Cilluffo is ¶ Director of HSPI. ¶ Founded in 2003, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy ¶ Institute (HSPI) is a nonpartisan “think and do” tank whose mission is to build bridges ¶ between theory and practice to advance homeland security through an ¶ interdisciplinary approach. By convening domestic and international policymakers and ¶ practitioners at all levels of government, the private and non-profit sectors, and academia, HSPI creates innovative strategies and solutions to current and future threats ¶ to the nation HSPI Issue Brief 16 ¶ June 21, 2012 “DRONES IN YEMEN: IS THE U.S. ON TARGET?” http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/drones.pdf]

In the past year, drone strikes and Special Operations Forces (SOF) eliminated key ¶ AQAP members at a time when the U.S. lacked any viable counterterrorism partner in ¶ Yemen.¶ 5¶ Drones (airstrikes) have eliminated several key AQAP leaders over the past ¶ year. On September 30, 2011, U.S. counterterrorism forces killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an ¶ important member of AQAP’s external operations branch and a key online radicalizer ¶ facilitating the recruitment of Western al Qaeda fighters. Eliminating Awlaki robbed al ¶ Qaeda of one of its few notable theologians with the cultural and linguistic fluency to ¶ resonate powerfully with Westerners. Additionally, Awlaki had the potential to invigorate al Qaeda’s brand during a particularly dark period for our adversaries after ¶ Bin Laden’s death. With Awlaki came the demise of Samir Khan, AQAP’s American ¶ propagandist and editor of the online al Qaeda English language magazine Inspire. ¶ While Inspire’s effectiveness as an online radicalizing agent is debatable, the ¶ magazine’s frequency and quality have been notably diminished since Khan’s death, ¶ and the magazine appears to be less effective in rallying future rounds of AQAP foreign ¶ fighter recruits. ¶ More recently, two current members of AQAP involved in al Qaeda’s bombing of the ¶ U.S.S. Cole in 2000, Abdul Mun’im Salim al Fatahani (January 31, 2012) and Fahd alQuso (May 6, 2012), were also killed by airstrikes.¶ 6¶ In addition, several other airstrikes ¶ have eliminated key AQAP members with operational linkages to al Qaeda’s senior ¶ leaders and training camps. Overall, the past year has clearly demonstrated the ¶ capability of U.S. drones and Special Operations Forces to engage AQAP in locations ¶ that would otherwise be unreachable, or require a significant military presence.

###### **Terrorists attacking Pakistan NOW By SALMAN MASOOD and**[**DECLAN WALSH**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/w/declan_walsh/index.html)

###### **Published: August 8, 2013**

#### Bomb Attacks Kill Dozens of Mourners in Pakistan and Afghanistan

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/world/asia/suicide-bombing-pakistan.html?_r=0>

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — The living were honoring the dead on both sides of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan on Thursday when militant bombers struck, killing at least 44 people in two attacks that coincided with one of the holiest days on the Muslim calendar. The heaviest toll was inflicted in the Pakistani city of Quetta, in western Baluchistan Province, where at least 30 people died in a suicide attack at the funeral of a policeman who had been killed just hours earlier. At the eastern end of the border, in the Afghan province of Nangarhar, a bomb exploded at a graveyard where people had gathered to pay their respects to a slain relative. Fourteen women and children from the same family were killed.

## Prolif

Their impact on this advantage is bullshit – Chester just says “nuclear-equipped robotics” causes extinction.

1. That happens in the SQ – computer systems control nuclear weapons
2. No ev we are going to arm drones with nukes
3. No clear scenario as to how that would cause extinction

#### Other countries aren’t drone threats

Zenko 2013 (Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at CFR, previously worked at Harvard Kennedy School and State Department, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” CFR Special Report No 56)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests. However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and cross- border adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingen- cies do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support. Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant investment required for armed drones in the near term.

#### The impact is a decade away and not likely

Zenko 2013 [Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Wash- ington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Ser- vice, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning January 2013 Council on Foreign Relations Special Report no. 65 “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”]

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#### Aff can’t stop drone prolif

Metz 2013 [Steven Metz is a defense analyst and the author of "Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy." His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears every Wednesday 27 Feb 2013 World Politics Review “Strategic Horizons: The Strategy Behind U.S. Drone Strikes” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12747/strategic-horizons-the-strategy-behind-u-s-drone-strikes]

Both of these arguments are shaky. There is little or no evidence that nations facing a serious enemy base their response on U.S. actions. States do what they feel they have to do. The implication that if the United States did not use drones against insurgents other nations would not simply defies common sense. On the second point, there is no doubt that drone strikes create anger. Unfortunately, this does tend to be directed at the United States rather than at the extremists who elected to use human shields in the first place. But again there is no evidence that a significant number of potential terrorists or terrorist supporters were motivated exclusively or primarily by American drone strikes.

#### No risk of an impact – deterrence and political ramifications check just like nuke weapons

Singh 4/13 Joseph Singh, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, reporter for Time, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, August 13th, 2012, http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.¶ Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones:¶ – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue.¶ – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose.¶ – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face.¶ – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts.¶ In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Doesn’t lower the threshold for conflict

Carpenter and Shaikhouni 2011 [Charli Carpenter is associate professor of international relations at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and blogs about human security at the Duck of Minerva. Lina Shaikhouni is completing a degree in political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, with an emphasis on human rights and humanitarian law. June 7 2011 Foreign Policy “Don’t Fear the Reaper” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/07/dont\_fear\_the\_reaper?page=0,1]

Misconception No. 2: Drones Make War Easy and Game-Like, and Therefore Likelier. Remote-controlled violence even with a human in the loop also has people concerned: Nearly 40 percent of the op-eds we studied say that remote-control killing makes war too much like a video game. Many argue this increases the likelihood of armed conflict.¶ It's a variation on an old argument: Other revolutions in military technology -- the longbow, gunpowder, the airplane -- have also progressively removed the weapons-bearer from hand-to-hand combat with his foe. Many of these advances, too, were initially criticized for degrading the professional art of war or taking it away from military elites. For example, European aristocrats originally considered the longbow and firearms unchivalrous for a combination of these reasons.¶ It's true that all killing requires emotional distancing, and militaries throughout time have worked hard to devise ways to ease the psychological impact on soldiers of killing for the state in the national interest. Yet it's not so clear whether the so-called Nintendo effect of drones increases social distance or makes killing easier. Some anecdotal evidence suggests the opposite: Drone pilots say they suffer mental stress precisely because they have detailed, real-time images of their targets, and because they go home to their families afterward rather than debriefing with their units in the field. Studies haven't yet confirmed which view is accurate or whether it's somehow both.¶ Even if some variant of the Nintendo effect turns out to be real, there is little evidence that distancing soldiers from the battlefield or the act of killing makes war itself more likely rather than less. If that were true, the world would be awash in conflict. As former Lt. Col. Dave Grossman has documented, at no time in history has the combination of technology and military training strategies made killing so easy -- a trend that began after World War I. Yet as political scientist Joshua Goldstein demonstrates in a forthcoming book, the incidence of international war -- wars between two or more states -- has been declining for 70 years.¶ The political debate over drones should move away from the fear that military advancements mean war is inevitable and instead focus on whether certain weapons and platforms are more or less useful for preventing conflict at a greater or lesser cost to innocent civilian lives. Activists should keep pressure on elected officials, military personnel, and other public institutions to make armed conflict, where it occurs, as bloodless as possible. For example, some human rights groups say the Nintendo effect itself could be harnessed to serve humanitarian outcomes -- by embedding war law programming into game designs.

#### Zero risk of a global drones precedent---it’s inevitable regardless of what the U.S. does

Robert Wright 12, “The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate,” 11/14/12, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-incoherence-of-a-drone-strike-advocate/265256/

Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised the possibility that America is setting a dangerous precedent with drone strikes. If other people start doing what America does--fire drones into nations that house somebody they want dead--couldn't this come back to haunt us? And haunt the whole world? Shouldn't the U.S. be helping to establish a global norm against this sort of thing? Host Warren Olney asked Boot to respond. ¶ Boot started out with this observation:¶ I think the precedent setting argument is overblown, because I don't think other countries act based necessarily on what we do and in fact we've seen lots of Americans be killed by acts of terrorism over the last several decades, none of them by drones but they've certainly been killed with car bombs and other means.¶ That's true--no deaths by terrorist drone strike so far. But I think a fairly undeniable premise of the question was that the arsenal of terrorists and other nations may change as time passes. So answering it by reference to their current arsenal isn't very illuminating. In 1945, if I had raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might one day have nuclear weapons, it wouldn't have made sense for you to dismiss that possibility by noting that none of the Soviet bombs dropped during World War II were nuclear, right? ¶ As if he was reading my mind, Boot immediately went on to address the prospect of drone technology spreading. Here's what he said: ¶ You know, drones are a pretty high tech instrument to employ and they're going to be outside the reach of most terrorist groups and even most countries. But whether we use them or not, the technology is propagating out there. We're seeing Hezbollah operate Iranian supplied drones over Israel, for example, and our giving up our use of drones is not going to prevent Iran or others from using drones on their own. So I wouldn't worry too much about the so called precedent it sets..."

#### **It’s too late to solve drone prolif – more than 50 countries have the tech and China is about to mass-produce them**

Noel Sharkey, December 1, 2011, Professor of AI and Robotics and Professor of Public Engagement at the University of Sheffield and Leverhulme Research Fellow on Battlefield Robots, “The Automation and Proliferation of Military Drones and the Protection of Civilians,” http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=03668503-81b1-4af6-9fef-7418e6466828%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=106

There are now at least 50 countries using UAVs.2 Many of these are being developed in-house and many are being bought in (and probably copied). The US sells many of its drones to its closest allies in Europe, and recently the US company General Atomics was granted permission to sell its earlier generation predators in the Middle East and Latin America. Israel has an even wider range of markets, having recently expanded into Latin American countries. Countries that do not have the advantage of being a close ally of the US cannot yet buy armed drones, and so they are having to find other means of acquiring or developing them. India and Pakistan are working hard to develop attack drones, having failed to purchase any from the US or Israel. Russia has shown models of the MiG Skat unmanned combat aircraft, which is intended to carry out strike missions on air defences. It is, according to reports from Russia, able to carry cruise missiles and can strike both ground and naval targets. Iran demonstrated a rocket-launched UAV, the Karrar or ambassador of death, to the press in 2010. It carries two cruise missiles. It is not possible to ascertain how operational the Iranian and Russian craft are, but it is clear that, at the very least, they are moving in the right direction to make the technology. China is showing the greatest commercial potential for selling armed UAVs over the coming decade. It has made a showing of many different types of UAV at its air shows over the last five years, some almost replicas of the US drones. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission said that China ‘has deployed several types of unmanned aerial vehicles for both reconnaissance and combat’.3 According to the Washington Post, at the Zhuhai air show in China in November 2010, there were more than two dozen Chinese UAV models on display.4 Worryingly, the Washington Post quotes Zhang Qiaoliang of the Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute as saying, ‘The United States doesn’t export many attack drones, so we’re taking advantage of that hole in the market.’ This is worrying because it indicates the opening up of a large and expanding market of which all the major players will want a share. If it looks like China’s combat UAVs threaten to dominate the market, then others will start selling them and every developed nation will have them. This could have a significant impact on how disputes are handled and what constitutes a war.

## Solvency

#### **Drone courts destroy presidential flexibility and don’t work**

HRF, 2013 (Human Rights First, a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organization, published December 2012 and updated April 2013, “How to Ensure that the U.S. Drone Program does not Undermine Human Rights” http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/blueprints2012/HRF\_Targeted\_Killing\_blueprint.pdf)

Aside from the constitutional problems, the drone court would undermine national security. In an armed conflict, lethal force is appropriate under the laws of armed conflict, and no court should be asked to second-guess a commander’s decision. Outside an armed conflict, the Constitution authorizes the President to defend Americans with lethal force only in the face of an imminent threat when no other feasible means to disrupt the threat is available. When the threat is imminent, there is by definition insufficient time to seek judicial review. Adding a requirement of judicial process is impractical and would likely encourage the use of lethal force in situations where the threat is not actually imminent

#### **Drone courts sap prez powers powers and drone effectiveness – spills-over to disrupt all of counterterrorism**

Boot, 2013 (Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2-11-13, “A drone court is a terrible idea” http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/02/11/a-drone-court-is-a-terrible-idea-fisa-terroris/)

Nevertheless creating such a court would be a very bad idea because it would constitute a dangerous infringement on the president’s authority as commander-in-chief. To be sure, there are few cases of drone strikes involving American citizens such as Anwar al-Awlaki and it would probably not be any great burden in the war on terror to have those instances reviewed by a court. The danger is that this would be the establishment of a dangerous precedent, with judges soon being called upon to approve all drone strikes, whether the targets are American citizens or not. There is already a fair amount of bureaucracy to vet such strikes and minimize collateral damage, which sometimes results in the suspects making an escape before approval to fire a Hellfire missile can be obtained. Introducing judges into the mix would make such operations intolerably slow and unwieldy. If judges were given power to review military or CIA strikes taking place outside the country, where would this trend end? With troops having to read detainees on a foreign battlefield their Miranda rights? With judges having to approve in advance all military plans—including armored offensives and artillery barrages—to make sure they don’t infringe on someone’s civil rights? Such scenarios are not as crazy as they sound. Civil liberties lawyers have already been trying to get the U.S. courts to assume oversight of detainees held in Afghanistan—one federal judge even ruled that these detainees had a right to a hearing before being overruled by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Constitutional guarantees of rights are the bedrock of our democracy—but they don’t apply to foreign combatants. Not even if they happen to be citizens—as the entire Confederate Army was during the Civil War. The FISA court is well and good but it only operates on our soil. It doesn’t limit the National Security Agency from carrying out wiretaps abroad. So, too, no “drone court” should be established to judicially regulate the use of lethal force abroad by the military or covert forces of the United States government.

# 2NC

Codification solves 100% of the aff – the CP is what their authors actually want – creates a firm set of rules to minimize civilian casualties, increase accountability and comply with international norms

We solve i-law

1. 1NC metz says codification allows the US to influence foreign powers to develop legitimate uses of drones
2. 1AC Boyle just says we need to “establish a precedent other nations may follow” – we solve better b/c it is easier to adopt a legal code than a court
3. 1AC Zenko says we need an international normative framework to solve drone prolif – the aff can’t solve – they don’t strengthen international legal regimes

Zenko also says we need to be transparent to solve:

We solve that – they can’t – our evidence is comparative

Mulrine, 2013 (Anna Mulrine, staff writer at the Christian Science Monitor, May 24, 2013, “Would a US 'drone court' to authorize drone strikes be a good idea? (+video)” http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0524/Would-a-US-drone-court-to-authorize-drone-strikes-be-a-good-idea-video)

Critics of the drone program, however, are generally not reassured by the notion of oversight from a special drone court. They note that the FISA courts, on which the drone courts would be modeled, operate largely in secret, doing little to improve accountability to the public. What’s more, they say, national and international laws are already in place governing when drone strikes are legal. Those laws, they add, offer greater transparency than would a secret court. “I’m not big on this,” Sarah Holewinski, executive director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict, says of the drone courts. “The fact is, we have international laws. We have domestic laws. I would focus on those and say, ‘Look, here’s the due diligence you need to do in targeting a combatant. Here’s what you need to do in order to avoid civilians. Here’s what proportionality looks like.’ ” Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International’s Security and Human Rights Campaign, argues that drone courts would do little to change critics' fundamental concerns about drone strikes. “What’s needed on drones is not a ‘kill court,’ but a rejection of the radical redefinition of ‘imminence’ used to expand who can be killed – as well as independent investigations of alleged extrajudicial executions and remedy for victims,” he says.

Solves terror – Metz ev indicates it ends unnecessary strikes and reduces collateral damage – also shows we care about reducing casualties – accesses all of their “drones bad” arguments

### Perm

Links to politics – still restriction of PWP

#### Doesn’t solve presidential power

Bellia 2 [Patricia, Professor of Law @ Notre Dame, “Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows” Constitutional Commentary, , 19 Const. Commentary 87, Spring, Lexis]

Second, courts' failure to resolve the contours of the President's constitutional powers creates uncertainty about whether some forms of constitutionally based executive action have the same legal force as a federal statute. Returning to Dames & Moore, the fact that the Court rested the President's authority on grounds of congressional approval rather than implied constitutional authority avoided the difficult question of how the President could by his sole authority displace the application of the federal statutes that had provided the basis for Dames & Moore's original cause of action against the Iranian enterprises. [291](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=f19618c70694bf3d339be1d061d942b7&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAW&_md5=1b7b7f45414d178a7293c7eabf182ff3" \l "n291#n291" \t "_self) Similar questions arise with respect to the displacement of state law by operation of sole executive agreements. The result is confusion about whether sole executive agreements are the "supreme Law of the Land," [292](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=f19618c70694bf3d339be1d061d942b7&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAW&_md5=1b7b7f45414d178a7293c7eabf182ff3" \l "n292#n292" \t "_self) with the available precedents suggesting that they are [293](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=f19618c70694bf3d339be1d061d942b7&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAW&_md5=1b7b7f45414d178a7293c7eabf182ff3" \l "n293#n293" \t "_self) and the weight of recent commentary suggesting that they are not.

#### Congressional silence key to presidential power

**Bellia 2** [Patricia, Professor of Law @ Notre Dame, “Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows” Constitutional Commentary, , 19 Const. Commentary 87, Spring, Lexis]

To see the problems in giving dispositive weight to inferences from congressional action (or inaction), we need only examine the similarities between courts' approach to executive power questions and courts' approach to federal-state preemption questions. If a state law conflicts with a specific federal enactment, n287 or if Congress displaces the state law by occupying the field, n288 a court cannot give the state law effect. Similarly, if executive action conflicts with a specific congressional policy (reflected in a statute or, as Youngstown suggests, legislative history), or if Congress passes related measures not authorizing the presidential conduct, courts cannot give the executive action effect. n289 When Congress is silent, however, the state law will stand; when Congress is silent, the executive action will stand. This analysis makes much sense with respect to state governments with reserved powers, but it makes little sense with respect to an Executive Branch lacking such powers. The combination of congressional silence and judicial inaction has the practical effect of creating power. Courts' reluctance to face questions about the scope of the President's constitutional powers - express and implied - creates three other problems. First, the implied presidential power given effect by virtue of congressional silence and judicial inaction can solidify into a broader claim. When the Executive exercises an "initiating" or "concurrent" power, it will tie that power to a textual provision or to a claim about the structure of the Constitution. Congress's silence as a practical matter tends to validate the executive rationale, and the Executive Branch may then claim a power not only to exercise the disputed authority in the face of congressional silence, but also to exercise the disputed authority in the face of congressional opposition. In other words, a power that the Executive Branch claims is "implied" in the Constitution may soon become an "implied" and "plenary" one. Questions about presidential power to terminate treaties provide a  [\*151]  ready example. The Executive's claim that the President has the power to terminate a treaty - the power in controversy in Goldwater v. Carter, where Congress was silent - now takes a stronger form: that congressional efforts to curb the power are themselves unconstitutional. n290

### Links to politics

#### Presidents who cede their power or implement more restraint produces better outcomes.

Pildes’12 , Richard H., Law and the President (February 27, 2012). Harvard Law Review, Vol. 125, p. 1381, 2012; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012024¶

Thus, argue Posner and Vermeule, presidents have strong incentives¶ to adopt practices and take actions that establish and maintain¶ their credibility (p. 133). These incentives will lead smart presidents to¶ adopt various sorts of self-binding mechanisms that limit their discretion:¶ commitments to transparency so others can monitor and oversee;¶ or commitments to multilateral approaches in foreign policy so that¶ presidents can act only with approval of other nations; or commitments¶ to ceding some power to independent actors, such as special¶ prosecutors or other institutions within the executive branch; or similar¶ approaches through which presidents accept limits on their own power¶ (pp. 113–53). By acting consistently with these self-adopted constraints,¶ presidents build up their credibility by signaling that they are¶ using their discretion in acceptable ways and should therefore continue¶ to be granted that discretion — including discretion to avoid, circumvent,¶ or ignore the law when, in the President’s best judgment, doing¶ so will produce better outcomes

#### The most powerful signal a President can send

Pildes’12 , Richard H., Law and the President (February 27, 2012). Harvard Law Review, Vol. 125, p. 1381, 2012; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012024¶

That Posner and Vermeule miss the role of legal compliance as a¶ powerful signal, perhaps the most powerful signal, in maintaining a¶ President’s critical credibility as a well-motivated user of discretionary¶ power is all the more surprising in light of the central role executive¶ self-binding constraints play in their theory. After asserting that “one¶ of the greatest constraints on [presidential] aggrandizement” is “the¶ president’s own interest in maintaining his credibility” (p. 133), they¶ define their project as seeking to discover the “social-scientific¶ microfoundations” (p. 123) of presidential credibility: the ways in¶ which presidents establish and maintain credibility. One of the most¶ crucial and effective mechanisms, in their view, is executive selfbinding,¶ § Marked 16:30 § “whereby executives commit themselves to a course of action¶ that would impose higher costs on ill-motivated actors” (p. 137). As¶ they also put it, “a well-motivated president can distinguish himself¶ from an ill-motivated president by binding himself to a policy position¶ that an ill-motivated president would reject” (p. 135).¶ By complying with these constraints, presidents signal their good¶ faith and accrue more trust to take further action. Most importantly¶ from within Posner and Vermeule’s theory, these constraints, many¶ self-generated through executive self-binding, substitute for the constraints¶ of law. Law does not, or cannot, or should not constrain presidents,¶ in their view, but rational-actor presidents recognize that complying with constraints is in their own self-interest; presidents¶ therefore substitute or accept other constraints. Thus, Posner and¶ Vermeule recognize the importance of “enabling constraints”78 in effective¶ mobilization and maintenance of political power; that is, they recognize¶ that what appear to be short-term constraints on the immediate¶ preferences of actors like presidents might actually enable long-term¶ marshaling of effective presidential power. Yet they somehow miss¶ that law, too, can work as an enabling constraint; when it comes to¶ law, Posner and Vermeule seem to see nothing but constraint. Indeed,¶ this failing runs even deeper. For if presidents must signal submission¶ to various constraints to maintain and enhance their credibility — as¶ Posner and Vermeule insist they must — Posner and Vermeule miss¶ the fact that the single most powerful signal of that willingness to be¶ constrained, particularly in American political culture, is probably the¶ President’s willingness to comply with law.

## 4GW

#### **Drone courts destroy presidential flexibility and don’t work**

HRF, 2013 (Human Rights First, a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organization, published December 2012 and updated April 2013, “How to Ensure that the U.S. Drone Program does not Undermine Human Rights” http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/blueprints2012/HRF\_Targeted\_Killing\_blueprint.pdf)

Aside from the constitutional problems, the drone court would undermine national security. In an armed conflict, lethal force is appropriate under the laws of armed conflict, and no court should be asked to second-guess a commander’s decision. Outside an armed conflict, the Constitution authorizes the President to defend Americans with lethal force only in the face of an imminent threat when no other feasible means to disrupt the threat is available. When the threat is imminent, there is by definition insufficient time to seek judicial review. Adding a requirement of judicial process is impractical and would likely encourage the use of lethal force in situations where the threat is not actually imminent

#### **Drone courts sap prez powers powers and drone effectiveness – spills-over to disrupt all of counterterrorism**

Boot, 2013 (Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2-11-13, “A drone court is a terrible idea” http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/02/11/a-drone-court-is-a-terrible-idea-fisa-terroris/)

Nevertheless creating such a court would be a very bad idea because it would constitute a dangerous infringement on the president’s authority as commander-in-chief. To be sure, there are few cases of drone strikes involving American citizens such as Anwar al-Awlaki and it would probably not be any great burden in the war on terror to have those instances reviewed by a court. The danger is that this would be the establishment of a dangerous precedent, with judges soon being called upon to approve all drone strikes, whether the targets are American citizens or not. There is already a fair amount of bureaucracy to vet such strikes and minimize collateral damage, which sometimes results in the suspects making an escape before approval to fire a Hellfire missile can be obtained. Introducing judges into the mix would make such operations intolerably slow and unwieldy. If judges were given power to review military or CIA strikes taking place outside the country, where would this trend end? With troops having to read detainees on a foreign battlefield their Miranda rights? With judges having to approve in advance all military plans—including armored offensives and artillery barrages—to make sure they don’t infringe on someone’s civil rights? Such scenarios are not as crazy as they sound. Civil liberties lawyers have already been trying to get the U.S. courts to assume oversight of detainees held in Afghanistan—one federal judge even ruled that these detainees had a right to a hearing before being overruled by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Constitutional guarantees of rights are the bedrock of our democracy—but they don’t apply to foreign combatants. Not even if they happen to be citizens—as the entire Confederate Army was during the Civil War. The FISA court is well and good but it only operates on our soil. It doesn’t limit the National Security Agency from carrying out wiretaps abroad. So, too, no “drone court” should be established to judicially regulate the use of lethal force abroad by the military or covert forces of the United States government.

## Terror

#### Deterrence prevents Indo-Pak escalation—Extend Tepperman—Despite severe tensions no nuclear use in 10 years of nuclear capability—Officials on both sides will do whatever it takes to prevent nuclear war

We solve this conflict if they do -

#### Neither will strike first

Eric Vas (retired Lieutenant general) 2007 “Can India Avoid a Military conflict with Pakistan?” http://inpad.org/res45.html

Many urge India to stand down in order to decrease the tension between the two countries. As long as freedom remains a distant dream in Pakistan and its official media continues to preach hatred against India, our security forces must continue to remain alert. India's responses to Pakistan's current moves on the five fronts are on the right lines. India has declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but that it is prepared to give a befitting response to any Pakistani nuclear threat. India has stressed that it is prepared to discuss any issue, including J&K with Pakistan, but only when it stops its support of cross border terrorism. Meanwhile our security forces continue to intercept intruders and deal with armed terrorists within the State, while the government attempts to improve the administration and encourage dissidents to join the political system. J&K State elections are due in September. These will be fair and open elections, which may be witnessed by foreign observers in their individual capacities. Dissidents have been invited to take part in the elections to prove that they have public support. However, official Pakistani media continues its barrage of virulent anti-India propaganda. There are no visible signs that steps are being taken to stop and undo the damage being done by these tactics. Thus, to answer the question posed at the head of this article, while the Indo-Pak cold war continues, the military front is unlikely to escalate into a nuclear exchange or a full-fledged military conflict. It would be imprudent for Pakistan to do this, and it would not be cost effective for India to initiate an all out war. If cross border infiltration and terrorist attacks against innocent citizens continue the Government may order the armed forces to take appropriate action against terrorist bases within POK. The danger of an Indian raid across the LOC against a terrorist camp escalating into a major battle cannot be overruled.

#### Neither will be overly aggressive—Conflict will be terminated quickly—Both will be able to claim victory

Ahmed 2009—Ali Ahmed, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 27, 2009, “India-Pakistan Conflict Outcome Probability,” http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/IndiaPakistanConflictOutcomeProbability\_AAhmed\_271009

In a situation involving limited Indian war aims, Pakistan would respond with its defensive formations and use its strategic reserves in an offensive mode wherever possible.7 A Pakistani offensive, though in keeping with Pakistan’s doctrine of ‘offensive defence’8, may not eventuate in the event of an early war. Following the imposition of costs through air action, India expects to see hostilities terminated through international pressure. Air operations and pivot corps operations by India would reduce the windows available for launching Pakistani offensives inside Indian territory, which may prove very costly for Pakistan. Besides, there would be little scope for launching forces into Indian territory in the face of India’s broad front attacks. As demonstrated at Kargil, India would wrap up any gains it may make eventually. Pakistan may employ only a small proportion of its forces in defensive operations, seeking instead to preserve most of its forces for post-conflict internal political purposes, allowing its Army to stay at the apex of Pakistan’s political pyramid.9 In any post-conflict scenario military losses would compromise the Pakistan Army’s grip on power. Termination of India’s limited offensives would enable Pakistan to declare victory of sorts by claiming that it held up India’s conventional might with only a partial use of its forces. In such a circumstance, both states would be satisfied in having met respective conflict aims. India § Marked 16:34 § would have inflicted punishment on Pakistan and Pakistan would claim to have withstood it. Such a juncture of positive perceptions would be useful to begin strategic engagement for peace making and long term conflict resolution.10 The foregoing indicates that Pakistan’s conflict strategy is likely to comprise the following elements: war avoidance; conventional defence; counter offensive with strategic reserves;11 a resort to asymmetric war; and preservation of military assets. For Pakistan the nuclear dimension of the conflict would include a high nuclear threshold;12 nuclear signaling for deterrence; catalyzing external pressures; and, preservation of nuclear assets from attrition. Pakistan has mooted the ‘Samson Option’ only as a last resort.13 That deterrence would hold is the understandable refrain.14 Pakistan has always tried to maintain adequate conventional capability to fight India.15 It is aware it risks national suicide if it uses nuclear weapons first.16 The Pakistan Army is aware that Pakistan would be held accountable by the international community for breaching the ‘nuclear taboo’.17 Since the least provocative nuclear use option is use on its own territory, an accounting post-conflict would restrain the finger on the proverbial nuclear button.18 In military terms there are no realistic operational and tactical gains for Pakistan in resorting to nuclear first use that India cannot counter through retaliation.

## Drone Prolif

#### Zero risk of a global drones precedent---it’s inevitable regardless of what the U.S. does

Robert Wright 12, “The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate,” 11/14/12, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-incoherence-of-a-drone-strike-advocate/265256/

Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised the possibility that America is setting a dangerous precedent with drone strikes. If other people start doing what America does--fire drones into nations that house somebody they want dead--couldn't this come back to haunt us? And haunt the whole world? Shouldn't the U.S. be helping to establish a global norm against this sort of thing? Host Warren Olney asked Boot to respond. ¶ Boot started out with this observation:¶ I think the precedent setting argument is overblown, because I don't think other countries act based necessarily on what we do and in fact we've seen lots of Americans be killed by acts of terrorism over the last several decades, none of them by drones but they've certainly been killed with car bombs and other means.¶ That's true--no deaths by terrorist drone strike so far. But I think a fairly undeniable premise of the question was that the arsenal of terrorists and other nations may change as time passes. So answering it by reference to their current arsenal isn't very illuminating. In 1945, if I had raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might one day have nuclear weapons, it wouldn't have made sense for you to dismiss that possibility by noting that none of the Soviet bombs dropped during World War II were nuclear, right? ¶ As if he was reading my mind, Boot immediately went on to address the prospect of drone technology spreading. Here's what he said: ¶ You know, drones are a pretty high tech instrument to employ and they're going to be outside the reach of most terrorist groups and even most countries. But whether we use them or not, the technology is propagating out there. We're seeing Hezbollah operate Iranian supplied drones over Israel, for example, and our giving up our use of drones is not going to prevent Iran or others from using drones on their own. So I wouldn't worry too much about the so called precedent it sets..."

# 1NR

\*\*This may be missing a few cards because Wes forgot to save the original 1NR. E-mail [joehamaker@gmail.com](mailto:joehamaker@gmail.com) if you have questions.

#### Global economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996,2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectation of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to create a ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997) Miller (1999) and Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

#### Debt ceiling battle will trigger economic collapse – not symbolic fight, last time triggered dramatic swings in economic growth.

Ian Shepherdson, Contributor WALL STREET | 9/13/2013 @ 1:21PM |126 views http://www.forbes.com/sites/ianshepherdson/2013/09/13/the-debt-ceiling-fight-is-not-just-political-theater-your-portfolio-is-at-risk/

It is tempting to view the looming fight over raising the debt ceiling as little more than political theater. After all, the U.S. is not about to default on its obligations or pass a budget so tight that the debt ceiling would not need to be raised, thereby triggering a deep recession. Before you fetch the popcorn, though, remember that this position is not much different to 2011, when Congressional squabbling over the debt ceiling triggered a dramatic rollover in consumer and small business confidence, and a 16.7% plunge in the S&P 500 in just two-and-a-half weeks. You might believe that this time will be different because we have been here before and everyone knows a deal will be done, eventually. I hope you’re right, but that view is no more than an untested assertion, and it makes sense at least to contemplate the alternative. Your portfolio might thank you for it.

#### Impasse on debt ceiling causes loss of consumer confidence collapsing the recovery

John Morgan 9-1-13 IBD: White House Distorts the Budget Crisis Sunday, 01 Sep 2013 01:43 PM Read Latest Breaking News from Newsmax.com http://www.moneynews.com/Economy/budget-debt-ceiling-Obama-US/2013/09/01/id/523326#ixzz2epkNsTK3

The Washington Post predicted that when federal lawmakers get back to Washington next month and start addressing the budget and debt ceiling, "an impasse could diminish Americans' confidence about the economy." The Post said data from Gallup show two noticeable dips in confidence during the Obama presidency so far — one during the debt limit standoff during the summer of 2011, and the other during the fiscal cliff impasse at the end of 2012. "For a sense of what economic confidence will be like around the country this fall, it's well worth tuning into what is going on at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue," The Post concluded. If Congress and the White House cannot agree on terms to raise the debt ceiling, it could result in another credit downgrade for the United States, according to The Christian Science Monitor.

#### Obama will be able to stand strong over Republicans now in avoiding acrimonious debt ceiling battles

Politico, 9-12-13 Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/white-house-obamacare-debt-negotiations-96741.html#ixzz2epOKtixt

Senate Democratic leaders echoed White House arguments in a Capitol Hill press conference on Thursday, and they feel confident that their solidarity will prevail over a fractured House Republican Conference that just had to pull a stopgap bill to keep the government funded into the fall because it wouldn’t gut Obamacare. “The biggest thing has been the uniformity in the refusal to negotiate on the debt ceiling,” said Matt House, the communications director for Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.). “We think at the last minute they’re going to be the ones that have to blink and come to us.”

House Republicans are badly fractured over spending. They can’t agree among themselves on whether to keep spending on its current trajectory, cut it further than the caps agreed to in previous budget deals, or, as a handful of Republicans believe, raise it a little bit. More important at the moment, they are divided over whether to shut down the government in the name of starving Obamacare.

#### \*PC key to avoid protracted debt ceiling battle

JULIE PACE — AP White House Correspondent Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda

Published: September 12, 2013 Updated 2 hours ago Read more here: http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/2013/09/12/3704721/obama-seeks-to-focus-on-domestic.html#storylink=cpy

WASHINGTON — With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his progress could hinge on the strength of his standing on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis. "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach. "The American people are still interested in making sure that our kids are getting the kind of education they deserve, that we are putting people back to work," Obama said. The White House plans to use next week's five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial collapse to warn Republicans that shutting down the government or failing to raise the debt limit could drag down the still-fragile economy. With Hispanic Heritage Month to begin Monday, Obama is also expected to press for a stalled immigration overhaul and urge minorities to sign up for health care exchanges beginning Oct. 1. Among the events planned for next week is a White House ceremony highlighting Americans working on immigrant and citizenship issues. Administration officials will also promote overhaul efforts at naturalization ceremonies across the country. On Sept. 21, Obama will speak at the Congressional Black Caucus Gala, where he'll trumpet what the administration says are benefits of the president's health care law for African-Americans and other minorities. Two major factors are driving Obama's push to get back on track with domestic issues after three weeks of Syria dominating the political debate. Polls show the economy, jobs and health care remain Americans' top concerns. And Obama has a limited window to make progress on those matters in a second term, when lame-duck status can quickly creep up on presidents, particularly if they start losing public support. Obama already is grappling with some of the lowest approval ratings of his presidency. A Pew Research Center/USA Today poll out this week put his approval at 44 percent. That's down from 55 percent at the end of 2012. Potential military intervention in Syria also is deeply unpopular with many Americans, with a Pew survey finding that 63 percent opposing the idea. And the president's publicly shifting positions on how to respond to a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria also have confused many Americans and congressional lawmakers. "In times of crisis, the more clarity the better," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a strong supporter of U.S. intervention in Syria. "This has been confusing. For those who are inclined to support the president, it's been pretty hard to nail down what the purpose of a military strike is." For a time, the Obama administration appeared to be barreling toward an imminent strike in retaliation for the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack. But Obama made a sudden reversal and instead decided to seek congressional approval for military action. Even after administration officials briefed hundreds of lawmakers on classified intelligence, there appeared to be limited backing for a use-of-force resolution on Capitol Hill. Rather than face defeat, Obama asked lawmakers this week to postpone any votes while the U.S. explores the viability of a deal to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles. That pause comes as a relief to Obama and many Democrats eager to return to issues more in line with the public's concerns. The most pressing matters are a Sept. 30 deadline to approve funding to keep the government open — the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1 — and the start of sign-ups for health care exchanges, a crucial element of the health care overhaul. On Wednesday, a revolt by tea party conservatives forced House Republican leaders to delay a vote on a temporary spending bill written to head off a government shutdown. Several dozen staunch conservatives are seeking to couple the spending bill with a provision to derail implementation of the health care law. The White House also may face a fight with Republicans over raising the nation's debt ceiling this fall. While Obama has insisted he won't negotiate over the debt limit, House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday said the GOP will insist on curbing spending. "You can't talk about increasing the debt limit unless you're willing to make changes and reforms that begin to solve the spending problem that Washington has," the Ohio Republican said.

## Link

### I/L

#### The plan is a huge win for the tea party.

Grim 2013 (Ryan Grim, June 11, 2013, “Divisions Over National Security State Scramble Old Alliances, Political Coalitions,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/11/nsa-leak\_n\_3421415.html)

The contours of the debate around security and civil liberties that began the day after the 9/11 attacks have been steadily shifting ever since, but have recently become contorted in the wake of revelations about the depth and breadth of the National Security Agency's secret surveillance. The debate coincides and overlaps with disagreement over indefinite detention, the use of force abroad and, specifically, the employment of drones in a sprawling array of countries in the so-called global war on terror.¶ The debate has taken on a partisan bent, with grassroots Democrats broadly lining up in surveys to defend the administration, and Republicans charging that presidential authority goes too far. But among the leaders in Washington and the media, alliances are scrambling, with the greatest dissension within conservative ranks.¶ The battle inside the GOP has left leading tea party figures such as Sens. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and Mike Lee (R-Utah), Glenn Beck and Rush Limbaugh in uncomfortable alignment with independent Sen. Bernie Sanders, a self-described Democratic socialist from Vermont who caucuses with Democrats; Michael Moore; Glenn Greenwald; Julian Assange and Daniel Ellsberg. They are pitted against establishment figures from both sides, such as Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham (S.C.), liberal Democratic Sen. Barbara Boxer (Calif.), and diplomat Richard Haass.¶ Democrats, owing partly to the simple fact that they control the levers of executive power, are more likely to back the extensive use of that authority. Two recent surveys differed in how respondents reacted to the NSA's surveillance programs, but they found similar patterns of partisanship.

#### Tea party members are unwilling to compromise on the budget when in power

McConnell and Todd 11 (Dugald and Brian, "Analysis: Debt fight shows tea party's influence - so far," July 30, politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/30/analysis-debt-fight-shows-tea-partys-influence-so-far/)

As lawmakers this weekend try to reconcile the two dueling debt bills in the House and Senate, one of the strongest forces they have to reckon with is the influence of the tea party lawmakers.¶ Their numbers are not overwhelming – of the 435 lawmakers in the House of Representatives, only 60 are members of the tea party caucus. Still, analysts say they have wielded outsized influence on the trajectory of the debt fight so far - but are also using tactics that could risk a backlash with the public. Their influence was clear on Thursday night, when House Speaker John Boehner had to postpone a vote on his debt-ceiling bill. On Friday, Boehner added a balanced budget amendment requirement - a provision dear to conservatives - to assure the bill passed.¶ Of the lawmakers who forced the change, thanks to their willingness to vote "no," more than half were members of the tea party caucus, according to an analysis by the blog fivethirtyeight.¶ The change in the bill means that, in whatever negotiations ensue to reconcile the Republican bill from the House and the Democratic bill in the Senate, House Republican leaders begin from a more conservative starting point.¶ "The tea party has forced Speaker Boehner more to the right. That involves deeper spending cuts, and also support for the balanced budget amendment," Darrell West at the Brookings Institution said. "They have had disproportionate impact on the entire congressional debate."¶ West says it is their unity, their determination and their inflexibility that have allowed the tea party lawmakers to punch far above their weight.¶ Last fall the tea party captured political lightning in a bottle and helped elect dozens of new members of Congress. They came to Washington in January on the promise to shock the political system into spending less and cutting more.¶ Their unwillingness to compromise has changed the debate in Washington over the way the government handles its debt.¶

#### More ev- tea party won’t compromise

Politico 7/19 (Mitch McConnell's fractured Senate GOP caucus , Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/senate-republicans-splintering-94451.html#ixzz2amsQ0772)

These Senate GOP factions aren’t set in stone, and some Republicans float from one group to another depending on the issue.¶ But the GOP tension is playing out on the Senate floor as members of the leadership have consistently voted “no” on tricky issues that could cause them political headaches — while rank-and-file Republicans are voting “yes.”¶ McConnell’s leadership team — including Sens. John Thune of South Dakota, John Barrasso of Wyoming, Roy Blunt of Missouri and Jerry Moran of Kansas — has taken the safe route by opposing these bipartisan proposals. That leaves a group of roughly a dozen GOP senators to swallow the tough and unpopular votes — ranging from opening debate on gun legislation to passing an immigration bill to confirming Richard Cordray to head the GOP-despised Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.¶ (Also on POLITICO: McCain stalls Dempsey nomination)¶ The entire leadership team opposed the immigration bill, for instance, which passed with the support of 14 Republican senators, and the leaders voted to filibuster a bipartisan border security deal drafted by Sens. Bob Corker of Tennessee and John Hoeven of North Dakota. The leadership opposed beginning debate on gun legislation, even though 16 of their GOP colleagues voted to bring the measure to the floor. Most voted to continue filibustering Chuck Hagel as defense secretary, even as 71 senators from both parties voted to allow a vote on confirmation.¶ Some think the leadership is ducking the tough votes and allowing the rank-and-file to shoulder the burden.¶ “This leadership team has adopted the Obama ‘lead-from-behind’ approach to governing,” said a senior Senate Republican source, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. “It hasn’t worked for the president and it doesn’t appear to be working here either.”¶ Republican leaders defend their approach, arguing that they typically are siding with a majority of the conference on a number of divisive issues, not with the smaller number of Republicans voting with Democrats, Cornyn argued.¶ “I think the majority of the conference votes the same way I do,” Cornyn said. “In some of these issues, we’re not united. It’s really as simple as that.”¶ The GOP factionalism could become even more significant this fall when it’s time to cut deals with Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and the White House on boosting the debt ceiling and keeping the government operating past September. McCain, Corker and other members of the “Supper Club” — a group of Republicans who have been discussing budget issues with White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough — met with McConnell on Thursday afternoon, seeking strategies for those looming fiscal showdowns, which will really kick off in September.¶ McCain wants to see Senate Republicans negotiate with Democrats on these critical matters, but there are a number of GOP conservatives — especially in the House — who are prepared to shut down the government or default on the debt unless Obama caves to their spending demands.

### I/L

#### **Tea Party support of Boehner is key to budget deal- fights cause Boehner to cut them loose undermines Republican strategy on debt talks.**

Maass ’13 Harold Maass September 12, 2013 3:22 AM <http://news.yahoo.com/john-boehner-vs-tea-party-impending-showdown-072200060.html> John Boehner vs. the Tea Party: The impending showdown

Boehner and other House GOP leaders are trying to avert such a calamity with a compromise that they pitched this week, which would entail a vote on a stopgap spending measure that would [keep government agencies](http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-gop-defunding-obamacare-plan-shifts-toward-delaying-it-20130910,0,4825515.story) open from October 1 to December 15, at a level that preserves the sequester budget cuts. A separate measure would propose defunding ObamaCare.¶ Boehner had to postpone a vote on the plan Wednesday, though, [due to a revolt](http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20130912/NEWS03/309129960/1066/NEWS03) by several dozen Tea Party conservatives. They argue that Boehner and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (Va.) are squandering the leverage provided by the Sept. 30 deadline, in exchange for a symbolic vote against ObamaCare that will never pass the Democratic-controlled Senate. GOP leaders are trying to soothe their troops by saying they will insist on a one-year delay of ObamaCare in any deal to raise the debt limit, an even bigger budgetary matter looming in October.¶ ¶ "But here's the rub," [says Greg Sargent at The Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/09/11/john-boehner-must-cut-loose-the-tea-party/). "At some point, something will have to pass with a lot of Dems." And President Obama and his fellow Democrats have vowed not to horse-trade over raising the debt ceiling. Here's more from Sargent:¶ That will leave only two choices: Pass a debt limit hike with mostly Democrats, stiff-arming the Tea Party, or allow economic havoc to break out. Boehner isn't going to do the latter. So his only choice will be the former...¶ Which means that at some point this fall, Boehner will have to cut the Tea Party loose, and suffer the consequences. [[Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/09/11/john-boehner-must-cut-loose-the-tea-party/)]¶ Not all conservatives think it will — or should — get to that point. [W. James Antle III at The American Conservative](http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-ted-cruz-cant-win-a-government-shutdown/), who supports repealing ObamaCare, says Tea Party Republicans are pursuing the wrong strategy, since ObamaCare is likely to "collapse under its own weight" once it's implemented:¶ A failed attempt to defund ObamaCare would be just as pointlessly symbolic as the various House repeal and delay votes. But instead of winning Democratic votes and underscoring the enduring unpopularity of ObamaCare, it might unify the Democrats and deepen the GOP's unpopularity. [[The American Conservative](http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-ted-cruz-cant-win-a-government-shutdown/)]¶ Still, that isn't likely to appease a furious conservative base that views ObamaCare as a socialist takeover of the health care system. And the Tea Party has shown time and again that it, not Boehner, wields the real power in the Republican caucus. [Carrie Wofford at U.S. News & World Report](http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/carrie-wofford/2013/09/10/the-tea-partys-defund-obamacare-push-is-just-silly) says, "Boehner may indeed try to defund America. After all, his speakership rests in part on his ability to keep the extremists in his caucus supporting him — not always easy with Eric Cantor breathing down his neck.

#### Boehner loves drones which means he will fight the Tea Party and destroy compromise with them

David Weigel Feb 6, 2013  
Boehner Backs Obama on Targeted Killing

<http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/02/06/boehner_backs_obama_on_targeted_killing.html>

Here's one reason why drone warfare and targeted killing don't really get discussed in Washington unless there's a memo leak or a protest: There's bipartisan consensus to whistle awkwardly and let the system continue. At John Boehner's weekly press conference, PRI's Todd Zwillich asked whether the most powerful Republican in the country, a "constitutional officer," had any concerns about targeted killing. After all, Congress could hold hearings. Congress could cut funding. "[House Intelligence Committee] Chairman Mike Rogers put out a statement yesterday," said Boehner, "and I agree with that statement." He didn't quote the statement, but what Rogers said yesterday was that targeted killing of American citizens was a "lawful act of national self-defense." Via the AP: When an individual has joined al-Qaida — the organization responsible for the murder of thousands of Americans — and actively plots future attacks against U.S. citizens, soldiers, and interests around the world, the U.S. government has both the authority and the obligation to defend the country against that threat. In general, Republicans agreed with the legal theories behind all this when George W. Bush was president. They agree with the theories now. They might call for more transparency, as Sen. John Cornyn is doing, but they don't do so because they question the basis for the attacks.